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L

ou Fisher’s proliﬁc writings on the war power—
the constitutional repository of authority to initiate war and lesser military hostilities on behalf
of the American people—have informed and, for
the better part of four decades, shaped discussions and debates on the respective roles of Congress and the
president, from the halls of academe to the corridors of power.
Widely cited and invoked on hundreds of occasions by political scientists, historians, and legal academics, his work has
opened doors for serious consideration of his views by representatives in all three branches of the federal government. It
has, as well, established his place in the front-rank of constitutional scholars and, almost certainly, earned for his scholarship an enduring inﬂuence on discussions about the
constitutional authority to order the use of military force.
Fisher’s thesis is clear and convincing. The War Clause of
the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have
Power . . . To declareWar,” vests in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate all military hostilities on behalf of the
American people (Art. I, Sec. 8). The president, in his capacity
as commander in chief, has the authority to repel invasions of
the United States, and the power to conduct war once declared
or otherwise authorized by Congress, but possesses no constitutional power to authorize the use of force. Until 1950, no president had asserted a unilateral executive power to initiate war.
Beginning, however, with Harry Truman’s decision to deploy
troops to Korea—without congressional authorization—every
president except Dwight Eisenhower has laid claim to a presidential war power. As a result, Americans have witnessed, for
the past half century, a string of presidential wars in direct violation of theWar Clause of the Constitution. As Fisher has written, “[t]he drift of the war power from Congress to the President
after World War II is unmistakable” (Fisher 2004, 261).
Fisher’s penetrating analysis of the purported legal bases
of executive war making, including his examination of textual
assertions of a presidential power to initiate military hostilities, have thoroughly discredited executive branch eﬀorts to
circumvent congressional authorization—the sine qua non for
the constitutional use of force. Thus, the president has neither
an extra-constitutional nor an inherent power to wage war
(Fisher 2004, 20–22, 69–73; Fisher 2007a, 1–22; Fisher 2007b,
139–52). Presidential resort to an act of authorization of military force by an international organization such as the United
Nations or NATO, is unavailing because treaties, which are
made by the president and Senate and do not include a role
for the House of Representatives, fall short of the constitutional requirement of an aﬃrmative vote by both houses of
Congress (Fisher 1997, 1237–279; Fisher 2004, 81–99, 105–14,
doi:10.1017/S104909651300070X

169–74, 175–201; Fisher 2012, 176–89). Policy arguments, not
grounded in the Constitution, have no currency. At all events,
the Constitution requires congressional authorization for the
use of military force.
Presidential usurpation of the war power, like congressional abdication of its constitutional duty to decide on matters
of war and peace, has grave consequences. It poses, as Fisher
has observed, “a threat to constitutional government, civil liberties, and national security” at home and abroad. “It represents, moreover, the culmination over the past 50 years of
unilateral presidential wars accompanied by few checks from
Congress or the judiciary. Academics, the media, and the general public have shown little understanding of constitutional
limits and little interest in keeping the president within legal
bounds” (Fisher 2006, 23–52).
Indiﬀerence to presidential war making, however, does not
diminish its danger to constitutional values, republican principles, and the national interest. As Fisher has pointed out,
President Lyndon Johnson feared the impact on his own political fortunes of a decision he might make to withdraw the
United States from Vietnam, despite his conclusion that the
war was unwinnable. He feared being labeled soft on communism. Moreover, “[i]nstead of formulating a plan for the
national interest,” Fisher noted, Johnson determined to lie
“‘in the pursuit of self-interest’” (Fisher 2000, 51; Fisher 2006,
25). Misleading statements, and outright deception by presidents, including James K. Polk, Harry S. Truman, Ronald
Reagan, and George W. Bush, among others, run deep in our
history, as Fisher has written, and underscore the dangers of
unilateral presidential war making (Fisher 2010, 171–84).
Fisher’s consistent defense of congressional control of the
war power rests on constitutional principles, not on partisan
concerns, and certainly not on a naïve assumption that Congress will always reach a wise or correct decision. He is not so
much “pro-Congress” as he is “pro-Constitution.” Indeed, he
has been critical of Congress for its abdication and surrender
of its constitutional power and responsibility to make decisions on matters of war and peace. In the wake of presidential
aggrandizement of the war power in the Vietnam War, for
example, Congress might have revived and defended its constitutional authority over matters of war and peace. “Instead
of reasserting congressional power, the War Powers Resolution marked an abject surrender of legislative prerogatives to
the president” (Fisher 2000, 13; Fisher and Adler 1998, 1–20).
Still, he embraces the idea that wiser decisions in foreign, as
in domestic aﬀairs, are made through reliance on checks and
balances, shared decision making and the cross-ﬁre of debate
by the nation’s representatives. His position certainly ﬁnds
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support in the historical record that reveals the ﬂaws of unilateral executive actions, grounded in misperception, poor judgment, political motives and ambition, and faulty intelligence,
not to mention acts of presidential deception (Fisher 2000,
51–66; Fisher 2004, 202–35; Fisher 2010, 171–84).
Fisher’s defense of the constitutional principles that govern the use of military force, reﬂective of a nonpartisan analysis, has won, at various times, praise and commendation from
both Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill. Presidential usurpation of the war power, often the target of Fisher’s
criticisms, has not endeared him to the executive branch. Occasionally, however, executive oﬃcials, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, have belatedly and, perhaps surprisingly, embraced
Fisher’s scholarly conclusions. Former White House Counsel
to President Richard Nixon, John Dean, whose own critical
works on the abuse of power have earned for him redemption
and considerable respect from previous critics, has justly characterized Fisher’s highly acclaimed, best-selling Presidential
War Power, as the premier book on the subject (Dean 2007,
314).
On publication of the ﬁrst edition of Presidential War Power
(1995), the distinguished historian, Theodore Draper, wrote
for the New York Times Book Review a trenchant and enthusiastic critique of the book. Draper exalted Fisher’s success in
refuting the claims by US presidents of a unilateral executive
power to initiate military hostilities. He observed that ever
since the Korean War, “Presidents have been violating the Constitution of the United States,” and declared that Fisher “had
taken on all of the Presidents and their lawyers who have contrived for almost half a century to oﬀer excuses for autonomous Presidential war-making.” Draper described Fisher’s
book as “a hygienic eﬀort to bring us back to the law” (Draper
1995, 1).
Fisher’s works on the war power, like his many other books
and some 400 articles on a variety of constitutional issues,
have been written in characteristically lean and lucid prose
with a clarity rarely achieved among academics. They reﬂect
clear premises, thorough and illuminating archival research,
balanced analysis, and conclusions grounded in and directed
by the evidence. His framework for analysis taps the cornerstones of convention for legal scholars: constitutional text,
debates in the Constitutional and State Ratifying Conventions, commentary contemporaneous with the framing of the
Constitution, governmental practice in the early years of the
republic, and judicial rulings. He has, as the New York Times
observed, taken on “all comers” and come to grips with views
and arguments of scholars and government oﬃcials who have
advanced the claim of a unilateral presidential authority to
commence war.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES

We can learn a great deal about the work of the Constitutional Convention, not merely from what was done there, but
also from what was said. The War Clause grants to Congress
power “to Declare War.” Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution declares: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
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United States.” To the extent that these provisions may require
reconciliation, Fisher turns to the debates in the Philadelphia
Convention. They reveal, Fisher wrote in Presidential War
Power, “that the framers were determined to circumscribe the
President’s authority to take unilateral military actions” (Fisher
2004, 8).The nature of the debates on the power to initiate
war leave no doubt that the framers vested that authority in
Congress alone.
Fisher’s unerring narration of the Convention debates is
clear and eﬃcient. An early draft had empowered Congress to
“make war.” On August 17—the second, ﬁnal, and most significant day of debate on the war power, which coincidentally
falls on Fisher’s birthday although he claims not to have been
present at the creation—Charles Pinckney objected that legislative proceedings were “too slow” for the safety of the country in an emergency, because he expected Congress to meet
but once a year. James Madison and Elbridge Gerry, in a joint
motion, proposed to substitute “declare” for “make,” leaving
to the president “the power to repel sudden attacks.” Their
motion carried on a vote of 7 to 2. When Rufus King explained
that the word “make” would allow the president to conduct
war, which was an “Executive function,” Connecticut changed
its vote and the ﬁnal tally became 8 to 1 (Fisher 2004, 3–6;10;
Farrand 1966, 2: 318–19).
The meaning of the debate was unmistakable. Congress,
alone, would possess the authority to initiate war; the president would exercise authority to repel invasions. Because invasion represented a grave emergency, the president, in his
capacity as Commander in Chief, was empowered “to take
actions necessary to resist sudden attacks either against the
mainland of the United States or against American troops
abroad.” But the president, Fisher observed, “never received a
general power to deploy troops whenever and wherever he
thought best, and the framers did not authorize him to take
the country into full-scale war or to mount an oﬀensive attack
against another nation.” That was the sole province of Congress (Fisher 2004, 8–9).
The framers’ decision to assign the war power to Congress,
rather than the president, represented a dramatic rejection of
the executive model for war and foreign aﬀairs, a design practiced in England and the world over. Delegates, as Fisher
explains, were familiar with the fact that kings and despots
and tyrants had often marched their people into war, for less
than meritorious reasons, and usually for their own personal
or political motivations. Given the framers’ emphasis on collective decision making, and their rejection of executive unilateralism, the Convention, as James Wilson of Pennsylvania
declared, was designed to prevent one man from hurrying “us
into war.” On the contrary, “it is calculated to guard against it.
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of
men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of
declaring war is vested in the legislature at large” (Elliot 1836,
2: 528; Fisher 2004, 9).
By the end of the Convention, no delegate was on record
as supporting the concept of a unilateral executive power to
initiate war or military hostilities. Indeed, during the course
of debates, only one man, Pierce Butler, wanted to vest the
war power in the president whom, he argued, “will have the
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requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation
will support it.” The framers, as Fisher wrote, “uniformly
rejected his proposal.” Give Butler credit for being a quick
study. He took his lumps from delegates who were shocked, as
Elbridge Gerry put it, because “he never expected to hear in a
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare
war.” But by the end of the debate on August 17, Butler not
only reversed his position, but introduced a measure on the
ﬂoor that would vest in the legislature the authority to end
war, just as it enjoyed the authority to initiate war. In the
South Carolina Ratifying Convention, Butler told his fellow
delegates that a particular delegate had had the temerity to
propose a presidential war power but that the delegates had
rejected the idea. He made no mention of the name of the
author of that proposal (Fisher 2004, 9; Adler 2003, 972–73).
INFLUENCES ON THE CONVENTION

The Convention’s constitutional design for initiating war, as
Fisher has demonstrated, was shaped in large measure by the
framers’ commitment to republican governance, which empha-

Articles of Confederation warned that “nations in general will
make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything
by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their
nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects
merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for
personal aﬀronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize
or support their particular families or partisans. These and a
variety of other motives, which aﬀect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctiﬁed by
justice or the voice and interests of his people” (Fisher 2004,
10).
Jay’s insights echoed throughout the early years of the
republic. Madison, for example, wrote in 1793, that war is “the
true nurse of executive aggrandizement. . . In war, the honors
and emoluments of oﬃce are to be multiplied; and it is the
executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is
in war, ﬁnally, that laurels are to be gathered; and it is the
executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions
and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, are

The framers’ decision to assign the war power to Congress, rather than the president,
represented a dramatic rejection of the executive model for war and foreign aﬀairs, a
design practiced in England and the world over. Delegates, as Fisher explains, were
familiar with the fact that kings and despots and tyrants had often marched their people
into war, for less than meritorious reasons, and usually for their own personal or
political motivations.
sized shared decision making and checks and balances, and
rejected unilateral executive power. The delegates’ deepseated fear of executive power, born of their own experience
and their reading of history, led them to break from the
monarchical model that governed England and much of the
world and that placed in the hands of the executive sole authority over matters of war and national security. The framers, as
Fisher has explained, dramatically rejected the “executive
model” and granted to Congress, not the president, exclusive
control over the decision to go to war as well as the lion’s
share of foreign aﬀairs authority. The Convention’s blueprint
was admirably summed up by James Madison in words that
Fisher views as authoritative: “Those who are to conduct a war
cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether
a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are
barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free
government, analogous to that which separates the sword from
the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws” (Fisher 2004, 11).
History and experience provided a valuable guide to the
Convention. “In their study of past governments,” Fisher
wrote,” the framers understood that executives, in search of
fame and glory, had an appetite for war” (Fisher 2006, 25).
Fisher’s conclusion is grounded in John Jay’s insights in Federalist No. 4, where the Secretary of Foreign Aﬀairs under the

all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.” Five
years later, as Fisher observed, Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson that the Constitution “supposes, what the History of
all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power
most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly
with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legsl”
(Fisher 2004, 10).
THE EARLY REPUBLIC

The understanding of the Convention, as Fisher has described
it, was embraced by the various state ratifying conventions,
and aﬃrmed in the Federalist Papers, government practice,
and judicial decisions in the early period of the republic—
without dissent. The ratiﬁers’ understanding of the allocation
of the war power was illuminated in North Carolina, where
James Iredell, soon to be a member of the US Supreme Court,
distinguished, in words that reﬂected Alexander Hamilton’s
analysis in Federalist No. 69, the limited authority of the president with that of the English monarch. The English King,
wrote Iredell, was not only Commander in Chief “but has
power, in time of war, to raise ﬂeets and armies. He also has
authority to declare war.” In contrast, the president “has not
the power of declaring war by his own authority, nor that of
raising ﬂeets. Those powers are vested in other hands. The
power of declaring war is expressly given to Congress.” In
PS • July 2013 507
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South Carolina, Charles Pinckney assured his colleagues that
the “President’s powers did not permit him to declare war”
(Fisher 2004, 9–10).
EARLY PRACTICE

Over the past half-century, proponents of an executive war
power have sought to ground their claims in historical precedent, by asserting that early presidents had unilaterally
authorized the use of military force. The compilation of lists
of purported instances of presidential war making, however,
represents little more than an exercise in revisionism that is
betrayed by the historical record. Fisher’s thorough examination of the practice of going to war in the early republic has
aﬃrmed, and extended, previous historical analyses that have
discredited executive branch assertions of unilateral presidential war making (Adler 1988, 17–26, 35–36; Fisher 2004, 17–55;
Wormuth and Firmage 1986, 133–150). Fisher has demonstrated that early presidents—George Washington, John
Adams, and Thomas Jeﬀerson—adhered to the constitutional
design and advanced no claims of a unilateral presidential
power to initiate military hostilities. Washington, for example, refused to order the use of force against an Indian tribe
in 1792, on the ground that authority to commence hostilities is constitutionally granted to Congress. In the Quasi-

it is for Congress, alone, to decide whether a war should be
“perfect” or “imperfect,” that is, general or limited. In addition, it is for Congress, not the president, to decide where war
may be waged, and whether it might be “limited in place, in
objects, and in time.” In Bas, the Court held that Congress
had authorized “hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases.” There was no “authority given to commit hostilities on land,” a stricture that sharply limited the
discretion of the Commander in Chief to conduct war (Bas v.
Tingy, 43).
Chief Justice John Marshall aﬃrmed the sweep of congressional authority the following year, in Talbot v. Seeman: “The
whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United
States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be
resorted to as our guides in this inquiry” (Talbot v. Seeman
1801, 28).
The teaching of these cases, like the Court’s ruling in Little
v. Barreme in 1804, is clear. Fisher has justly stated: “Those
cases do not imply that once Congress authorizes war, the
President is at liberty to choose the time, location, and scope
of military activities. In authorizing war, Congress may place
limits on what presidents may and may not do” (Fisher 2004,
25). In fact, the Court in Barreme, in another opinion delivered by Marshall, held that the president is bound to obey

Fisher’s painstaking demolition of the contrived lists of presidential wars in the early
republic has undermined eﬀorts by scholars and oﬃcials to invoke historical practice as
an ally. The fact that the early practice of decision making on matters of war and peace
conforms to the constitutional design has forced revisionists to seek support elsewhere.
War with France, 1798–1800, Congress enacted two dozen
statutes authorizing the use of force. Adams made no assertion of a presidential power to initiate hostilities. As president, Jeﬀerson was challenged by the attacks of pirates of
Tripoli on US commercial vessels sailing in the Mediterranean. As tempting as it might have been to authorize the
initiation of force against the pirates, Jeﬀerson was yet mindful of the constitutional distinction between oﬀensive acts,
which are within the province of Congress, and defensive
acts, which are within the realm of presidential power (Fisher
2004, 17–36).
Fisher’s painstaking demolition of the contrived lists of
presidential wars in the early republic has undermined eﬀorts
by scholars and oﬃcials to invoke historical practice as an
ally. The fact that the early practice of decision making on
matters of war and peace conforms to the constitutional design
has forced revisionists to seek support elsewhere.
JUDICIAL PRACTICE

As Fisher has shown, several judicial decisions arising out of
the Quasi-War that were rendered by the Supreme Court at
the dawn of the republic held that Congress possesses, as Madison observed, sweeping authority to “commence, conclude
and continue” war. In Bas v. Tingy (1800), the Court held that
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statutory commands imposed by Congress in the conduct of
war (Little v. Barreme, 179).Two years later, that lesson was reafﬁrmed in United States v. Smith (1806), in an opinion written by
Justice William Paterson, a member of the Constitutional Convention, while riding circuit. In words that have erected a platform for Fisher, Justice Paterson declared: “The President of
the United States cannot control the statute nor dispense with
its execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do
what the law forbids. If he could, it would render the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure; which is a
doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any
supporters in our government” (United States v. Smith, 1230,
quoted in Fisher 2004, 25–26, 29–31; Fisher 2005, 469–71). These
decisions have never been overturned and remain good law.
CONTEMPORARY POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS

Advocates of a unilateral presidential authority to decide on
matters of war and peace have advanced various policy arguments to defend the shift of power from Congress to the president. As Fisher has observed, they tend to focus on “the need
for secrecy and prompt action, qualities supposedly associated in some unique fashion with the Executive.” These arguments, he concludes, have but “a superﬁcial allure” (Fisher
2004, 261). Fisher rightly dismisses assertions that “the
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conditions of the modern world” necessitate placement of the
war power in the hands of the president. After all, in words
that harken to the values and concerns of the framers, if “the
current risk to national security is great, so is the risk of presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement—all the more reason for insisting that military decisions be thoroughly
examined and approved by Congress. Contemporary presidential judgments need more, not less, scrutiny” (Fisher 2004,
262).
For Fisher, claims by champions of an executive war power
are apt to place too great a premium on the need for speed and
dispatch and the judgment of the president. The framers,
Fisher notes, understood emergencies, which is why they
vested in the executive the power to repel invasions. But defensive actions beyond defense of the nation and America troops,
even if it involves our allies, require discussion and debate
before risking the blood and treasure of the nation. If, as Fisher
explains, the president perceives an emergency that is afoot in
another part of the world, then he may decide to act and to
seek from Congress retroactive authorization, which was the
framers’ solution to the problem of emergency, and the “procedure that Lincoln used in the Civil War” (Fisher 2004, 263;
Adler 2012, 376–89).
CONCLUSIONS

The extension of a presidential power to initiate hostilities,
whether in the eighteenth or twenty-ﬁrst century, invites the
very fears that induced the framers to vest in Congress, not
the president, the power to go to war. Separation of powers
issues are enduring, for they raise, fundamentally, the question of the repository of decision-making authority. For the
framers in 1787, as for Fisher in 2013, the fundamental value
choices remain the same: executive unilateralism, featuring
the judgment, temperament, and vision of a single person,
versus discussion and debate, collective decision making, and
checks and balances. Unless or until the Constitution is
amended to grant to the president the authority to go to war,
we can expect Lou Fisher to consistently defend the Constitution as it is. He is part of a grand tradition that embraces the
virtues and values of constitutionalism, which was given eloquent voice by Justice Robert H. Jackson, who wrote in the
landmark Steel Seizure Case: “With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long
preserving free government except that the Executive be under
the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary delibera-

tions” (Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 655, quoted
in Fisher, 2004, 281). 䡲
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